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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Roy Ayers Baxter, Jr., was sentenced to a unified term of ten years, with two-and
one-half years fixed, after he pled guilty to, and was convicted of, domestic violence.
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Baxter filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea based largely
on a post-plea communication the prosecutor had with the psychologist who performed
Mr. Baxter’s domestic violence evaluation, which led the psychologist to increase his
assessment of Mr. Baxter’s risk of reoffending from moderate to high. Based on this
increased risk assessment, the prosecutor decided to recommend a rider rather than
probation. Mr. Baxter contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he met his burden of showing a just reason
to withdraw his plea, which was rendered unknowing as a result of the post-plea change
in his domestic violence evaluation, and the State did not make any showing that it
would be prejudiced by the withdrawal of Mr. Baxter’s guilty plea.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Baxter was involved in an altercation with his wife, who is the mother of two
of his three children, on February 14, 2015.

(Conf. Exs., pp.7-8.)

Following a

preliminary hearing, Mr. Baxter was charged by Information with felony domestic
violence and violation of a no contact order. (R., pp.40, 41-42.) At a status conference
on May 27, 2015, counsel for Mr. Baxter informed the district court that the parties had
the outline of a plea agreement in place, but Mr. Baxter was going to obtain a domestic
violence evaluation before deciding whether to plead guilty. (R., pp.72, 89.)

1

Mr. Baxter was evaluated by a licensed psychologist, Dr. Bill Arnold, who issued
a Domestic Violence Evaluation Report on June 17, 2016. (Conf. Exs., pp.58, 238-45.)
Based on his interview of Mr. Baxter and his review of the police reports and the
transcript of the preliminary hearing, among other things, Dr. Arnold concluded
Mr. Baxter presented a moderate risk to reoffend.
R., p.89.)

(Conf. Exs., pp.238, 243, 244;

Counsel for Mr. Baxter shared a copy of Dr. Arnold’s report with the

prosecutor. (8/26/16 Tr., p.5, Ls.23-24; R., p.101.) The prosecutor expressed concerns
about the report, but did not indicate she would not accept Dr. Arnold’s conclusion that
Mr. Baxter presented a moderate risk to reoffend. (8/26/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.5-11; R., p.89.)
Based on Dr. Arnold’s conclusion that Mr. Baxter presented a moderate risk to
reoffend, Mr. Baxter accepted a plea offer and entered into a written plea agreement on
July 1, 2016.

(8/26/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.12-14; R., pp.74-84, 89.)

Pursuant to the plea

agreement, Mr. Baxter agreed to plead guilty to felony domestic violence and, in
exchange, the State agreed to dismiss a felony influencing charge and no contact order
violations in this and other cases. (R., p.82; 7/1/16 Tr., p.5, Ls.12-24.) The State
agreed that if Mr. Baxter was determined to present a high risk to reoffend on the
domestic violence evaluation, it would recommend a unified sentence of ten years, with
three years fixed, and with a period of retained jurisdiction. (7/1/16 Tr., p.5, L.25 – p.6,
L.7; R., p.82.) However, if Mr. Baxter was determined to present less than a high risk to
reoffend, it would recommend Mr. Baxter be placed on probation. (7/1/16 Tr., p.5, L.25
– p.6, L.7; R., p.82; R., p.82.) The district court accepted Mr. Baxter’s guilty plea on
July 1, 2016. (7/1/16 Tr., p19, Ls.18-25.)
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On July 7, 2016, the prosecutor e-mailed Dr. Arnold to provide him with
statements made by Mr. Baxter at the change of plea hearing. (R., pp.89, 102; 8/26/16
Tr., p.20, Ls.10-22.) The prosecutor wrote:
I am not sure if it will change the outcome of your report finding a risk
level, but thought it would be important for you to know and consider.
When telling the court what he did, he said he had been drinking all day
and doing meth.1 He said, [“One] thing led to another, and the next thing
you know I backhanded her on the neck. Also in the scuffle with the
neighbor, I did hit her in the arm, and she had a bruise.[”]
(8/26/16 Tr., p.20, L.23 – p.21, L.6.) The prosecutor asked “if this has any impact on
your finding of risk.” (8/26/16 Tr., p.21, Ls.7-9.) Even though Dr. Arnold had a copy of
the police reports and the preliminary hearing transcript at the time he evaluated
Mr. Baxter, he issued an Addendum to Risk Ratings on July 8, 2016, stating that, based
upon the “additional information” provided to him by the prosecutor, “Mr. Baxter now
falls in the group of offenders who display a high risk of future violent offending.” (Conf.
Exs., p.58.) The prosecutor advised counsel for Mr. Baxter that she would recommend
a rider instead of probation based on Dr. Arnold’s new risk assessment. (R., p.89.)
Mr. Baxter filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and supporting memorandum
on August 16, 2016. (R., pp.94, 88-93.). Mr. Baxter argued, among other things, that
“the prosecutor’s intervention with Dr. Arnold after he entered his guilty plea rendered
the plea agreement in this case meaningless.”2 (R., p.91.) The State filed an objection

1

Though not central to the issue presented in this appeal, Mr. Baxter notes he did not
admit at the change of plea hearing to using methamphetamine on the date of the
offense. He stated that, on Valentine’s weekend, he and his wife “were just out drinking
and partying” but “[b]efore that, a couple days, it was actually out partying and doing
meth.” (7/1/16 Tr., p.14, Ls.13-18.)
2
Mr. Baxter also argued he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because the
State filed new charges against him prior to sentencing, which “ensured that he would
never be legitimately considered for probation.” (R., p.91.)
3

to Mr. Baxter’s motion. (R., pp.98-108.) The district court denied Mr. Baxter’s motion,
concluding Mr. Baxter did not have a just reason to withdraw his guilty plea, which was
knowing, intelligent and voluntary. (8/26/16 Tr., p.41, Ls.1-3, 17-19; R., pp.109-10.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a rider based in large part on Dr. Arnold’s
assessment that Mr. Baxter presented a high risk of reoffending. (9/23/16 Tr., p.33,
L.12 – p.34, L.8.) Counsel for Mr. Baxter recommended a ten-year term of probation.
(9/23/16 Tr., p.41, Ls.17-19.) The district court sentenced Mr. Baxter to a unified term
of ten years, with two and one-half years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.3 (9/23/16
Tr., p.46, L.23 – p.47, L.16.) The district court did not place Mr. Baxter on probation.
The judgment was entered on September 26, 2016, and Mr. Baxter filed a timely notice
of appeal on September 28, 2016. (R., pp.112-15, 118-20.)

3

At sentencing, the district court granted the State’s oral motion to consolidate this case
with three other cases (CR-FE-2016-9176, CR-FE-2016-4713, and CR-MD-2016-5434).
(9/23/16 Tr., p.27, Ls.14-19; R., pp.111, 116-17.) In CR-FE-2016-9176, the district
court sentenced Mr. Baxter for fraudulent misappropriation of personal identifying
information to a unified term of five years, with two years fixed, to be served
concurrently to the sentence imposed in this case. (9/23/16 Tr., p.47, Ls.2-24.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Baxter’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Baxter’s Motion To Withdraw
His Guilty Plea Because Mr. Baxter Met His Burden Of Showing A Just Reason To
Withdraw His Guilty Plea, And The State Did Not Make Any Showing Of Prejudice
“Whether to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the
district court and such discretion should be liberally applied.” State v. Hartsock, 160
Idaho 640, __, 377 P.3d 1102, 1103 (Ct. App. 2016). Where a defendant moves to
withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, the grant of such motion “is not an automatic
right,” but “a less rigorous standard applies.” State v. Williston, 159 Idaho 215, 217
(Ct. App. 2015).

In the pre-sentencing context, “the defendant has the burden of

showing that a just reason exists to withdraw the plea.” Id. “Once the defendant has
met this burden, the state may still avoid a withdrawal of the plea by demonstrating the
existence of prejudice to the state.” Id. at 218; see also State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho
408, 411 (Ct. App. 1991) (stating “relief will be granted absent a strong showing of
prejudice by the state”). When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on
appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the
lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower
court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600
(1989).
The district court did not reach its decision to deny Mr. Baxter’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea by an exercise of reason because Mr. Baxter met his burden of
showing a just reason to withdraw his guilty plea and the State made no showing of
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prejudice. Mr. Baxter obtained a domestic violence evaluation before deciding whether
to plead guilty, and decided to plead guilty only after the evaluation was completed, and
after the evaluator concluded he presented only a moderate risk to reoffend. Counsel
for Mr. Baxter shared the domestic violence evaluation report with the prosecutor before
Mr. Baxter decided to plead guilty.

(8/26/16 Tr., p.5, Ls.23-24; R., p.101.)

The

prosecutor claimed Mr. Baxter made “gross omissions” to the domestic violence
evaluator and did not accurately describe his substance use. In fact, after reviewing the
report, the prosecutor informed defense counsel that she would not recommend a bond
reduction lower than $100,000 because of Mr. Baxter’s “gross omissions as to his
conduct in the instant offense, as well as his misstatements regarding substance use.”
(R., p.101.)

But the prosecutor did not inform defense counsel that she would be

challenging Dr. Arnold’s assessment of Mr. Baxter’s risk of reoffending.

(8/26/16

Tr., p.6, Ls.5-11; R., p.89.) Mr. Baxter decided to plead guilty knowing the domestic
violence evaluation had been completed, and with the understanding that the State
would be recommending probation.
At the change of plea hearing, counsel for Mr. Baxter informed the district court
that the domestic violence evaluation had been completed, and he had shared the
report with the State, “so we don’t have to do that.” (7/1/16 Tr., p.7, Ls.21-23.) After the
district court accepted Mr. Baxter’s guilty plea and was setting the matter for sentencing,
counsel for Mr. Baxter stated, “Your Honor, it’s our hope that since the domestic
violence evaluation has already been done, that we can set it more quickly.” (7/1/16
Tr., p.20, Ls.3-5.)

The district court later said, “And you say you already have a

domestic violence evaluation done, and you’ll submit that.” (7/1/16 Tr., p.21, Ls.1-2.)
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Counsel responded, “I’ve submitted it to the state. We’ll make sure the presentence
investigator gets a copy, or I could just send a copy to you and then we’re done with
that I guess. Either way is fine by me.” (7/1/16 Tr., p.21, Ls.3-7.) At no point did the
prosecutor state she was no longer satisfied with the domestic violence evaluation, or
would be contacting Dr. Arnold to suggest changing the results of the evaluation, based
on Mr. Baxter’s statements at the change of plea hearing.
Six days after the change of plea hearing, the prosecutor contacted Dr. Arnold to
ask whether Mr. Baxter’s statements at the change of plea hearing—specifically
concerning the nature of his offense and his methamphetamine use—had “any impact
on your finding of risk.” (8/26/16 Tr., p.21, Ls.7-9.) Notably, Mr. Baxter’s statements at
the change of plea hearing were consistent with the police reports and the testimony at
the preliminary hearing, which the prosecutor knew of prior to entering into a plea
agreement with Mr. Baxter, and which Dr. Arnold knew of when he evaluated
Mr. Baxter. Nonetheless, Dr. Arnold concluded that, based on the additional information
provided to him by the prosecutor, Mr. Baxter “now falls into the group of offenders who
display a high risk of future violent offending.”4 (Conf. Exs., p.58.)
In its opposition to Mr. Baxter’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the State
asserted in the district court that “there is a significant likelihood that the filing of the
Defendant’s motion is linked to the pre-sentence investigation’s less than flattering
assessment of the Defendant.” (R., p.106.) Mr. Baxter recognizes that a district court
may temper the liberal treatment normally afforded to a presentence motion to withdraw

4

Dr. Baxter qualified his conclusion somewhat by stating Mr. Baxter is in “the marginally
high risk range for future violence” meaning “he was placed low within the normative
group placed in the high risk range.” (Conf. Exs., p.57.)
8

a guilty plea where the defendant’s apparent motive is to avoid what he perceives to be
the probable sentence based on the presentence investigation report or other
information. See Hartsock, 377 P.3d at 1104. However, there is simply no indication
that Mr. Baxter moved to withdraw his guilty plea in this case because of the
presentence investigator’s recommendation for a rider. At the hearing on Mr. Baxter’s
motion, counsel for Mr. Baxter told the district court Mr. Baxter “never would have pled
guilty to a rider offer.” (8/26/16 Tr., p.15, Ls.12-13.) The district court asked defense
counsel whether he would withdraw the motion if the prosecutor agreed to recommend
probation, and he answered, “Yes,” but the prosecutor said she was not willing to
recommend probation. (8/26/16 Tr., p.16, Ls.13-17; p.27, Ls.10-13.)
When Mr. Baxter entered into a plea agreement with the State and pled guilty to
domestic violence, he understood the State would recommend probation based on the
already completed domestic violence evaluation.

Mr. Baxter knew the State’s

sentencing recommendation would not be binding on the district court, but it was still the
critical factor in his decision to plead guilty. This Court has recognized that, before
sentencing, the inconvenience to the court and prosecution resulting from a change of
plea is usually slight compared to protecting the right of the accused to trial by jury.
State v. Hawkins, 117 Idaho 285, 291 (1990); Johnson, 120 Idaho at 415. Here, the
State never argued it would be prejudiced by the withdrawal of Mr. Baxter’s guilty plea.
The district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Baxter’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea.

9

CONCLUSION
Mr. Baxter respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the
district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and remand this case to
the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 2nd day of January, 2017.

___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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